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Abstract—Dealing with pollution attacks in inter-session net-
work coding is challenging due to the fact that sources, in
addition to intermediate nodes, can be malicious. In this work,
we precisely define corrupted packets in inter-session pollution
based on the commitment of the source packets. We then propose
three detection schemes: one hash-based and two MAC-based
schemes: InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM. InterMacCPK is the first
multi-source homomorphic MAC scheme that supports multiple
keys. Both MAC schemes can replace traditional MACs, e.g.,
HMAC, in networks that employ inter-session coding. All three
schemes provide in-network detection, are collusion-resistant, and
have very low online bandwidth and computation overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding involves packets being combined at interme-
diate nodes inside the network. Depending on whether packets
from the same or different sessions are mixed, network coding
is classified as intra-session or inter-session, respectively. Inter-
session coding, that is the focus of this paper, has been
implemented in practice, such as in wireless mesh networks
[1], [2] and streaming gestures [3].
The mixing nature of network coding makes it extremely
vulnerable to pollution (a.k.a. Byzantine modification) attacks.
In such an attack, malicious nodes inject corrupted packets
that then are combined and forwarded by downstream nodes,
eventually resulting in a large number of corrupted packets
propagating in the network. This wastes network resources,
such as bandwidth and CPU time. More critically, it prevents
receivers from decoding the original packets. A large body of
work has focused on pollution attacks in intra-session coding
[4]–[25], while pollution attacks in inter-session coding have
received significantly less attention [27]–[29].
In this paper, our goal is to detect pollution attacks in inter-
session network coding using cryptographic primitives. This is
particularly challenging because not only intermediate nodes
but also sources can be malicious and initiate attacks them-
selves. Recently, Agrawal et al. [27] formulated the problem
for the first time and presented a detection scheme based on
homomorphic signatures. This scheme has high computation
overhead due to many public-key signature verification and
modular exponentiation operations performed at each node per
packet. Furthermore, the signature size is large and does not
scale as it increases linearly in the number of sources and
packets sent by them.
In this paper, we introduce three novel detection schemes:
one hash-based and two MAC- based schemes, all of which are
significantly more efficient than [27]. The key ingredient of our
approaches is the use of commitment (to a trusted controller) of
source packets. This commitment allows us to precisely define
corrupted packets, thereby enabling detection of all corrupted
packets, including some that [27] cannot detect. We build upon
this idea and design three schemes:
• A hash-based detection scheme, that combines homomor-
phic [30] and traditional hash functions, e.g., SHA-1.
• InterMacCPK, a multi-source homomorphic MAC scheme.
It is the first homomorphic MAC scheme that allows tags
to be generated under different keys.
• SpaceMacPM, a combination of an existing inner-product
homomorphic MAC scheme (built for intra-session coding
[25]) and a private inner-product protocol [31].
Our hash-based scheme allows nodes to detect corrupted
packets right after they receive them, thus providing in-network
detection. Both of our MAC schemes can replace traditional
MACs, e.g., HMAC, to provide end-to-end detection. Moreover,
they can be used as building blocks for other schemes that
provide in-network detection, such as [17], [18], [20] and
[24]. The hash-based detection scheme is arbitrarily collusion-
resistant. Meanwhile, depending on the in-network detection
scheme used, a scheme built on one of the MAC schemes
could be either arbitrarily collusion-resistant or c-collusion-
resistant, for a predetermined small c. We also custom design
commitment schemes that offer high bandwidth efficiency for
both MAC schemes. Most importantly, all proposed schemes
have significantly higher bandwidth and computation efficiency
than those of the state-of-the-art detection scheme for inter-
session coding [27]. In particular, simulation results show that
for a detection scheme built on one of our MAC schemes, both
the online bandwidth and computation overhead are low, as low
as 3% and 4 ms, respectively.
The proposed schemes provide alternative approaches to
detect corrupted packets in inter-session network coding. In
general, the MAC-based schemes have significantly lower
computation overhead than the hash-based scheme (Section
VI-B). SpaceMacPM offers lower commitment overhead (Sec-
tion VI-A), but InterMacCPK is less vulnerable to colluding
malicious receivers (end of Section V-D).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss related work. In Section III, we describe the
network operations, threat models, and definition of corrupted
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2packets. In Section IV, we present the proposed hash-based
detection scheme. In Section V, we describe InterMacCPK and
SpaceMacPM. In Section VI, we evaluate the performance of
our schemes. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Because pollution attacks pose a severe threat to the success
of network coding, a large body of research has been devoted to
designing defense mechanisms, including both information the-
oretic and cryptographic approaches. The existing approaches
provide error-correction capability [4]–[7], attack detection [8]–
[18], [20], [23], [24], [27], and attacker identification [21], [22],
[25], [29]. Most of these approaches, including our prior work
[23]–[25], are proposed for intra-session coding and are not
applicable to inter-session coding, as discussed in Section III-C.
We refer the reader to [23] for a comprehensive overview of
intra-session defense mechanisms. Here, we focus on defense
against pollution attacks in inter-session network coding.
Agrawal et al. [27] proposed a homomorphic signature
scheme to provide in-network detection for inter-session net-
work coding. In their scheme, the signature of a packet sent by
a source S consists of g hash values of all g source packets
sent by S, together with the public key signature of the hash
values. The hash values are computed using a homomorphic
hash function proposed in [30]. The signature of the hash is
computed using a secure signature scheme. The signature σy of
a packet y, which is a linear combination of packets belonging
to ` different flows, is the concatenation of the signatures of
` different signatures. The main drawbacks of this scheme are
(i) the expensive verification: the verification of σy involves
` public-key signature verification and one homomorphic hash
verification, and (ii) the large signature size: the size of σy is
large, including ` public-key signatures and g` hash values.
The approaches proposed in this paper are inherently dif-
ferent from [27]. We leverage the commitment of source
packets and build our detection schemes based on un-key and
symmetric-key cryptographic primitives as opposed to public-
key primitives. We significantly improve the bandwidth and
computation efficiency over [27] (Section VI). Furthermore, by
precisely defining corrupted packets, our schemes are able to
detect some corrupted packets that [27] cannot (Section III-D).
Dong et al. [29] proposed a scheme that allows for identify-
ing malicious nodes in inter-session network coding. When a
pollution is detected, a bit-level traceback procedure is executed
to identify the attacker. Our detection schemes are orthogonal
and complementary to this identification scheme.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model and Operation
Some of the notation we use are from [23] and [27]. Consider
a graph denoted by G = (V, E). There are s pairs of source-
receiver in the network, denoted by (Si, Ri), i ∈ [1, s]. Each
source, Si, sends packets to its corresponding receiver, Ri, by
first dividing the packets into generations. For simplicity, we
assume that all sources use the same generation size, g. It is
straightforward to extend our defense schemes to accommodate
different generation sizes. Si interprets its packets in a single
generation, vˆij , j ∈ [1, g], as vectors in a n-dimensional
vector space over a finite field Fq . Before sending, Si appends
to vˆi,j its coding coefficient, forming g augmented packets,
vi,1, · · · ,vi,g:
vi,j = (—vˆi,j—, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
g×(i−1)
,
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
g
, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
g×(s−i)
) .
We refer to the augmented packets, vi,j’s, as source packets
and vˆi,j as data of vi,j . We use aug(vi,j) to denote the coding
coefficients of vi,j .
Note that for each generation, there are m def= sg source
packets. The sources send source packets into the network gen-
eration by generation. Intermediate nodes in the network per-
form generation-based linear network coding, i.e., they linearly
combine packets that belong to the same generation. Packets
sent from different sources may be combined by intermediate
nodes. For example, when an intermediate node N receives `
packets, w1, · · · ,w`, which are some linear combinations of
the source packets sent by any set of sources, it chooses `
local coding coefficients, α1, · · · , α`, depending on the coding
scheme used, and then transmit y =
∑`
i=1 αiwi to one or more
of its outgoing edges. Note that if y is a linear combination
of the source packets vi,j’s then the last m symbols of y
contain its global coding coefficients. For clarity, we focus on
the transmission of a single generation by all the sources.
Let the subspace spanned by the source packets be Π def=
span(v1,1, · · · ,vs,g) and the subspace spanned by the data of
the source packets be Πˆ def= span(vˆ1,1, · · · , vˆs,g). We refer
to Π as the source space and Πˆ as the source data space.
When all nodes in the networks are benign, all packets in
the network belong to the source space. A receiver, Ri, can
decode the original packets sent by its corresponding source Si
after collecting enough packets. In particular, after collecting
m linearly independent packets, Ri can decode the original
packets by applying Gaussian elimination on the m× (n+m)
matrix formed by the collected packets. Ri may also be able to
decode using less than m linearly independent packets because
Ri is not interested in packets sent by the other sources.
B. Inter-Session Network Coding Characteristics
In inter-session network coding, it is often the case that
intermediate nodes are able to decode source packets from
the received coded packets. For instance, in COPE [1], every
encoded packet is decoded at the next hop. There are also
other coding schemes where encoded packet are decoded by
either the first hop or the second hop, e.g., see [2] and [3].
Furthermore, in inter-session coding, source packets of a source
Si may not traverse the whole network but only some parts of
the network: for instance, in a directed acyclic graph, packets
sent from Si should not travel to nodes that have no path to
Ri. We will exploit these observations later in the proposed
schemes.
Finally, the most important observation is that, in inter-
session network coding, not only intermediate nodes but also
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Fig. 1. An example of pollution attack in inter-session network coding. Source
S2 is malicious and all other nodes are benign. S2 pollutes the flow S1-R1
by injecting conflicting source packets (vˆ′2, 0, 1) and (vˆ2, 0, 1). R1 decodes
and recovers incorrect vˆ1.
some sources may be malicious. This differentiates the scenario
we study in this work from single-source intra-session coding.
We explicitly take this observation into account in our threat
model below.
C. Threat Model
We assume that up to s − 1 sources could be malicious,
any intermediate node may be malicious, and the receivers
are trusted. To pollute the network, the malicious nodes may
generate and inject any type of traffic into the network; they
may also collude among themselves. We assume the attackers
know about the construction of any cryptographic primitive
used but the attackers’ running time is polynomial in the
security parameter of cryptographic primitives.
Example Attack. Fig. 1 depicts the classic butterfly network
coding across two unicast sessions. There are two sources: S1 is
benign, but S2 is malicious. A, B, R1, and R2 are benign. The
generation size is 1. Only node A combines incoming packets,
and only R1 and R2 decode. Local coding coefficients at A are
fixed: α1 = α2 = 1. Packets sent by the nodes are annotated
on the edges. In this example, S2 successfully pollutes the
network because it causes an incorrect decoding at R1. More
specifically, by subtracting (vˆ2, 0, 1) from (vˆ1 + vˆ′2, 1, 1), R1
receives vˆ1 + vˆ′2 − vˆ2 instead of vˆ1.
Intra-Session Detection Failure. Both unkey cryptographic
approaches and key-based cryptographic approaches developed
for intra-session fail to detect corrupted packets in the inter-
session threat model. The ways they fail, however, are different.
We first consider applying the hash-based scheme proposed in
[12]. Prior to the transmission, A, B, R1, and R2 download
the hash of vˆ1 from S1 and hash of vˆ2 from S2. S2 can act
maliciously by sending to R1 the hash of vˆ2 but sending to
A and B the hash of vˆ′2. This makes A accept (vˆ
′
2, 1, 0), B
accept (vˆ1 + vˆ′2, 1, 1), and R1 accept (vˆ2, 1, 0). Therefore, S2
can still carry out the same attack.
Now, let us consider applying any of the proposed MAC
or signature-based approaches, such as, [10], [15]–[18], [20],
[23]. When using any one of these schemes, MAC tags or
signatures of packets must be generated under the same (private
or symmetric) secret key so that the homomorphic property of
the scheme holds. But if this is the case, a malicious source
knowing the key can generate a valid tag/signature of any
packet of its interest and pollute the network. For instance,
S2 can send to R1 (vˆ′1, 1, 0) and its valid tag/signature, where
vˆ1 6= vˆ′1, and R1 will accept this corrupted packet.
D. Corrupted Packet
Loosely speaking, we consider any packet that causes a
pollution of flows from benign sources corrupted. Nevertheless,
in order to detect a pollution attack, corrupted packets must be
precisely defined. We first require that each source, Si, commits
to its source packets before the transmission. We then define
a corrupted packet based on this commitment. (i) In our hash-
based scheme, we require each source to commit to the data of
each of its packets by sending the hash of the data to a trusted
controller. Let Πˆ be the space spanned by the committed data of
all the sources. We call Πˆ the committed source data space. (ii)
In our MAC-based schemes, we require each source to commit
to each of its whole packet as opposed to just the data. We
call the space spanned by all the committed source packets the
committed source space and denote it by Π.
Definition 1. Let Πˆ and Π be the committed source data
space and committed source space, respectively. A packet y
is considered corrupted if yˆ /∈ Πˆ or y /∈ Π.
The above definition helps us to design detection schemes
capable of detecting all corrupted packets. For instance, in Fig.
1, if S2 commits to vˆ2 then our schemes will help nodes A to
drop (vˆ′2, 0, 1), thus avoiding having (vˆ1+vˆ
′
2, 1, 1). In contrast,
the scheme in [27] only helps a node to detect conflicting
packets and does not detect all corrupted packets. For instance,
if [27] is used, A and B still accept vˆ′2 and (vˆ1 + vˆ
′
2, 1, 1),
respectively. (vˆ1+vˆ′2, 1, 1) is detected as corrupted at R1 if R1
receives vˆ2 first, or vˆ2 is detected as corrupted if R1 receives
(vˆ1 + vˆ
′
2, 1, 1) first.
E. Trusted Controller
Trusted controllers have been used explicitly in previous
work that identify and eliminate attackers [21], [22], [25]. They
have also been introduced implicitly by other detection schemes
[9]–[20], where a trusted source setups and distributes hash
values, MAC tags, and keys. In this work, we explicitly uses a
standalone trusted controller to support the commitment.
IV. THE HASH-BASED DETECTION
A. Key Observations and Approach
Observation 1. Let us revisit the discussion of applying
homomorphic hash functions to inter-session network coding
in Section III-C. We observe that the main reason why S2 can
successfully pollute flow S1-R1 is that S2 is able to distribute
different hash values of vˆ2 and vˆ′2 to A, B, and R1. If all nodes
in the network receive the same hash value, either hash of vˆ2
or vˆ′2, then S2 will not be able to carry out the attack because
one of the two will be dropped due to incorrect hash. Ensuring
that all nodes in the network receive the same hash value of vˆ2
or vˆ′2 is in fact equivalent to forcing S2 to commit to either vˆ2
or vˆ′2, thus making any linear combination involving the other
(non-committed) packet a corrupted packet.
Observation 2. As mentioned in Section III-B, in inter-
session network coding, it is often the case that intermediate
nodes completely decode coded packets and recover their
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Fig. 2. Commitment and hash distribution for the network of Fig. 1.
corresponding source packets. We exploit this fact and propose
to use traditional hash functions to check for the integrity of
these decodable packets. In other words, instead of verifying
a coded packet using an expensive homomorphic hash veri-
fication, a node decodes it and verifies the recovered packet
using an inexpensive traditional hash verification. Note that a
traditional hash verification is two to three orders of magnitude
less expensive than a homomorphic one. This observation is
especially beneficial to COPE-like coding schemes [1], where
every coded packet is decodable by any next hop.
Approach. Our hash-based detection scheme needs a trusted
controller. Denote this controller by C. The scheme is based
on the above observations and works as follows:
Setup: C sends to every node the description of a homomorphic
hash function (e.g.,H-DL, described in the next section) as well
as a traditional hash function, e.g., SHA-1. Before sending,
each source, Si (i ∈ [1, s]), augments its data following
the augmentation scheme described in section III. For every
source packet, vij (j ∈ [1, g]), Si computes a homomorphic
hash value and a traditional hash value, denoted as hij and
h¯ij , respectively. Each source then sends both hij and h¯ij to
C. The commitment of each source are the pairs (hij , h¯ij).
Every node downloads these pairs from C. We assume that the
hash descriptions and values are distributed through authentic
(tampering resistant) channels as usual applications of hash.
Fig. 2 illustrates how the hashes are distributed for the network
of Fig. 1.
Sending: At each node, sending packets, including linearly
combining incoming packets, is performed as usually.
Receiving and Verification: Upon receiving a packet y, if a node
is specified to decode by the coding scheme, it checks if it can
recover a source packet by decoding using y and its previously
received packets. (i) If it can, it uses the traditional hash check
to verify the integrity of the packet. (ii) If it cannot or in the case
the node is not specified to decode, it uses the homomorphic
hash check to verify the integrity of y. If the recovered source
packet (case (i)) or y (case (ii)) passes the verification, the node
marks y as legitimate and uses it in subsequent transmissions;
otherwise, it drops y.
B. Homomorphic Hash Scheme
A homomorphic hash scheme consists of three polynomial-
time algorithms:
• HashSetup(1λ, n): Input: unary representation of the secu-
rity parameter λ, and the dimension of the data space n.
Output: public parameters pp.
• Hash(pp, vˆ) : Input: public parameters pp and a data vector
vˆ ∈ Fnq . Output: hash value, h ∈ Fq , of vˆ.
– The hash of yˆ, a linear combination of m source data
vectors vˆi, i ∈ [1,m], is a hash vector h = (h1, · · · , hm),
where hi = Hash(pp, vˆi).
• Test(pp, yˆ, β¯,h) : Input: public parameters pp, a vector
yˆ ∈ Fnq , a vector of coefficient β¯ ∈ Fmq , and a hash vector
h ∈ Fmq . Output: > (true) or ⊥ (false).
Intuitively, let h be the set of hashes of the data of the source
packets. For a packet y with data yˆ and coding coefficients β¯,
if y is a linear combination of the source packets then Test
should outputs >. Also, it should be difficult for an adversary
to find a packet y outside of the source space such that Test
outputs >.
Correctness. For all pp← HashSetup(1λ, n), we require the
following properties for the correctness of the scheme:
• For all vˆ ∈ Fnq , if h = Hash(pp, vˆ) then for all i ∈ [1,m],
Test(pp, vˆ, ei,h) = > , where ei is the i-th unit vector
of the space Fmq and the j-th component of h, h(j), is
defined as follows: h(j) equals h if j equals i and equals
rj otherwise, where rj is any value in Fq .
• For all yˆ1, yˆ2 ∈ Fnq , β¯1, β¯2,h ∈ Fmq , and α1, α2 ∈ Fq ,
let yˆ = α1yˆ1 + α2yˆ2 and β¯ = α1β¯1 + α2β¯2. We
require that if Test(pp, yˆi, β¯i,h) = > for i = 1, 2 then
Test(pp, yˆ, β¯,h) = >.
Security. Let H = (HashSetup,Hash,Test) be a homomor-
phic hash. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary that takes as input pp ← HashSetup(1λ, n) and
outputs v∗ ∈ Fn+mq , an m-dimensional space V represented
as basis vectors vˆ1, · · · , vˆm, and a hash vector h ∈ Fmq .
Definition 2. We say that A breaks the homomorphic hash
scheme H if (i) vˆ∗ /∈ V , (ii) Test(pp, vˆi, ei,h) = > for i =
1, · · · ,m, and (iii) Test(pp, vˆ∗, aug(v∗),h) = >. We define
the advantage Hash-Adv[A, H] of A to be the probability that
A breaks H. We say that H is secure if for all PPT A, Hash-
Adv[A, H] is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Example Homomorphic Hash H-DL. This construction is
based on VH-DL [27] but customized to work with our
augmentation scheme.
• HashSetup(1λ, n):
– Choose a finite cyclic group G of prime order q > 2λ.
– Choose generators gi
R← G \ {1} for i = 1, · · · , n.
– Output pp := q, (g1, · · · , gn) and the description of G.
• Hash(pp, vˆ):
– Output h :=
∏n
i=1 exp(gi,v
(i)), where exp(a, b) = ab.
• Test(pp, yˆ, β¯,h): If
n∏
i=1
exp(gi,y
(i)) =
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), β¯(i))
5then output >; otherwise, output ⊥.
The correctness conditions hold as follows:
(1) For all vˆ ∈ Fnq , if h = Hash(pp, vˆ) then for all j ∈ [1,m]:
n∏
i=1
exp(gi,v
(i)) = h
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), e
(i)
j ) = h
1
m∏
i=1,i6=j
r0j = h
As a result, Test(pp, vˆ, ej ,h) = > .
(2) For all yˆ1, yˆ2 ∈ Fnq , β¯1, β¯2,h ∈ Fmq , and α1, α2 ∈ Fq ,
let yˆ = α1yˆ1 + α2yˆ2 and β¯ = α1β¯1 + α2β¯2. If
Test(pp, yˆi, β¯i,h) = > for i = 1, 2 then
n∏
i=1
exp(gi,y
(i)) =
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, α1yˆ
(i)
1 + α2yˆ
(i)
2 )
=
[
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, yˆ
(i)
1 )
]α1 [ n∏
i=1
exp(gi, yˆ
(i)
2 )
]α2
=
[
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), β¯
(i)
1 )
]α1 [ m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), β¯
(i)
2 )
]α2
=
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), α1β¯
(i)
1 + α2β¯
(i)
2 )
=
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), β¯) .
As a result, Test(pp, yˆ, β¯,h) = >.
Theorem 1. The homomorphic hash H-DL is secure assuming
the discrete logarithm problem in G is hard. In particular,
let A be a PPT adversary that breaks H-DL, then there
exists a polynomial-time algorithm B that computes discrete
logarithms in G such that Hash-Adv[A, H-DL] ≤ 2 · DL-
Adv[B, G], where DL-Adv[B, G] is the probability that B
computes discrete logarithms in G (formally defined in [32]).
Proof (based on proof of VH-DL): If A can break H-DL,
he can output v∗, vˆ1, · · · , vˆm, and h that satisfy definition 2.
Thus,
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, vˆ
∗(i)) =
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), aug(v∗)(i))
Let vˆ =
∑m
i=1 aug(v
∗)(i) vˆi. Since vˆ∗ is not a linear combina-
tion of vˆ1, · · · , vˆm, vˆ∗ 6= vˆ. Since Test(pp, vˆi, ei,h) = > for
i = 1, · · · ,m, and vˆ is a linear combination of vˆ1, · · · , vˆm,
Test(pp, vˆ, aug(v∗),h) = >. This means
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, vˆ
(i)) =
m∏
i=1
exp(h(i), aug(v∗)(i))
Consequently, A can find two distinct vector vˆ∗, vˆ ∈ Fnq such
that
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, vˆ
∗(i)) =
n∏
i=1
exp(gi, vˆ
(i)) .
Assume A can find this collision with probability  then A can
be used to compute discrete logarithms in G with probability
at least /2 based on Theorem 3.4 in [39].
C. Detection Guarantees
Using the downloaded hashes, all nodes in the network can
verify the integrity of all downloaded packets on-the-fly. The
following theorem summarizes the security guarantee of our
hash-based detection scheme.
Theorem 2. If a secure homomorphic hash scheme and a
secure traditional hash function is used in the detection scheme,
then the probability of a benign node accepting a corrupted
packet is negligible in the security parameter.
Proof: For a received packet y, for nodes that are specified
to perform decoding but cannot recover any source packets or
nodes that are not specified to perform decoding, they verify
the integrity of y using the verification of the homomorphic
hash scheme. Let h = {h1, · · · , hm}, where hi, i ∈ [1,m],
denotes the hash value of the data, vˆi, of the source packet
vi. A corrupted packet is a packet whose data is not in the
committed source data space; hence, if y is corrupted then yˆ /∈
span(vˆ1, · · · , vˆm). As a result, the probability that any node
N in the network accepts a corrupted packet is upper bounded
by the probability of breaking the homomorphic hash scheme,
which is negligible in the security parameter λ.
For a node N that is specified to perform decoding and
can recover a source packet from the decoding using y and
previously (verified) received packets, it checks the integrity
of y through checking the integrity of the newly recovered
source packet. The probability of accepting a corrupted y is
now dependent not only on the probability that the newly
recovered source packet is corrupted but passing the verification
but also on the probability that some of the previously received
packets are corrupted but passed the verification. The proof is
by induction:
Let negl denote a negligible function. Let px and py be the
probabilities of breaking the traditional hash and homomorphic
hash functions, respectively. Note that both of these probabil-
ities are negligible. Let yi denote packet i-th that arrives at
node N . Let Pr[yi] denote the probability that node N accepts
a corrupted packet yi. The first packet is either a source packet
or not, thus N performs either a traditional hash check or
homomorphic hash check. Hence,
Pr[y1] = px + py = negl
If the t-th packet is decodable, let yt =
∑t−1
i=1 αiyi + βv ,
where v is the newly recovered source packet; yi’s are previ-
ously received, verified packets; αi’s and β are some integer
coefficients. The probability that yt is corrupted but accepted
6by N , is
Pr[yt] =
t−1∑
i=1
Pr[yi] · Pr[αi 6= 0] + px + py
≤
t−1∑
i=1
Pr[yi] + negl
Since t is upper bounded by cm, where c is some small positive
integer, and Pr[y1] = negl, Pr[yt] is negligible for all t ≤ cm.
Finally, our hash-based detection scheme is collusion resis-
tant because collusion does not help to break the discrete log
assumption or a secure traditional hash function.
V. THE MAC-BASED DEFENSE
A. Key Observation
Observation 3. Let us revisit the discussion of applying
homomorphic MAC scheme in Section III-C. From the attack,
we observe that it is necessary that (i) each source generates
tags of its packets using its own secret key as opposed to using
a common key, or (ii) the controller generates all the tags under
a key secret to all the sources.
B. Homomorphic Multi-Source MAC (InterMac)
In this section, we present a novel multi-source homomorphic
MAC scheme, called InterMac, that allows different sources
to generate tags using different keys. Nonetheless, the tags are
combinable, and the malicious nodes cannot generate valid tags
of corrupted packets.
Definitions: A (q, n, s, g) multi-source homomorphic MAC
scheme is defined by four PPT algorithms:
• Generate(id, k,Π): Input: a source space/generation iden-
tifier, id; a secret key, k ∈ K¯, and a committed source
space, Π. k is only known to the trusted controller and
used for bootstrapping the MAC keys. Output: a key
set K def= {k1, · · · , ks}. The id is the unique source
space/generation identifier. Given the committed source
space Π, the Generate algorithm generates s keys, where
the i-th key can be used by source i to generate tags for its
source packets.
• Sign(ki,v): Input: key ki ∈ K used by source Si and a
source packet v sent by source Si. Output: tag t of v.
Let vi,1, · · · ,vi,g denote source packets sent by source Si.
The Sign algorithm signs the source space, Π, spanned
by the source packets of all the sources by running
Sign(id, ki,vi,j), for all i ∈ [1, s], j ∈ [1, g].
• Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (y`, t`, α`)): Input: ` (` > 0)
vectors y1, · · · ,y` ∈ Fn+mq ; their tags t1, · · · , t` ∈ Fq;
and their coefficients α1, · · · , α` ∈ Fq . Output: tag t of
vector y def=
∑`
i=1 αi yi.
• Verify(K,y, t): Input: a key set K, a vector y ∈ Fn+mq , and
its tag t ∈ Fq . Output: 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Correctness: The scheme must satisfy the following cor-
rectness requirement: Let Π be the committed source space
spanned by the committed source packets of all the sources:
vi,j , for all i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, g]. Let Π’s identifier
be id. Let k ∈ K¯, and K = {k1, · · · , ks} be the output
of Generate given id, k, and Π. Let ti,j = Sign(ki,vi,j)
and αi,j ∈ Fq , for all i ∈ [1, s] and j ∈ [1, g]. Let
t = Combine((v1,1, t1,1, α1,1), · · · , (vs,g, ts,g, αs,g)). Then
Verify
K, s∑
i=1
g∑
j=1
αi,j vi,j , t
 = 1 .
Security: We define the security using the following game:
Attack Game. We consider the following attack game for
a multi-source homomorphic MAC T = (Generate, Mac,
Combine, Verify), a challenger C, and an adversary A:
• Setup: The challenger generates a random key k R← K¯.
• Queries: A adaptively queries C. Each query is of the form
(idl,Πl), where Πl is a linear subspace represented by a
basis of m vectors, vi,j , i ∈ [1, s], j ∈ [1, g], and idl is the
space identifier. We require that all identifiers idl submitted
by A are distinct. To respond to a query for (idl,Πl),
the challenger does the following: Run Generate(idl, k,Πl)
to produce a key set Kl = {k1, · · · , ks}. Compute
ti,j = Sign(ki,vi,j), for all i ∈ [1, s], j ∈ [1, g]. Send
(t1,1, · · · , ts,g) and all keys in Kl but one to A.
• Output: The adversary A outputs a triplet (id∗,y∗, t∗). We
consider that the adversary wins the security game if
(i) id∗ = idl for some l,
(ii) y∗ /∈ Πl, and
(iii) Verify(Kl,y∗, t∗) = 1.
Requirement (i) is necessary as corrupted packet is only
defined when there is a committed source space. Requirement
(ii) indicates that the output packet by A is indeed a corrupted
packet. Finally, (iii) indicates that A successfully forges a
valid tag of the corrupted packet. Let Adv[A, T ] denote the
probability that A wins the above attack game. We define a
secure multi-source homomorphic MAC scheme as follows:
Definition 3. A (q, n, s, g) multi-source homomorphic MAC
scheme T is secure if and only if for all PPT adversaries A,
Adv[A, T ] is negligible.
The Construction of InterMac. We now present our con-
struction of InterMac. The key ingredient of this construction is
the generation of the key set K so that each source can compute
tags of its source packets using its own key; nonetheless, the
tags are still combinable.
• Generate(id, k,Π):
– Let v1,1, · · · ,vs,g ∈ Fn+mq be the committed source
packets that span Π, and let them be represented as row
vectors. For each p ∈ [1, s], let Mp be a matrix whose rows
are vectors in the following set
{vi,j | i = 1, · · · , s; i 6= p; j = 1, · · · , g} .
7In other words, Mp is a matrix consisted of committed
source packets of all other sources but source Sp. Note that
rank(Mp) = m− g. Let ΠMp denote the space spanned by
the rows of Mp.
– The null space of the matrix Mp, denoted as Π⊥Mp , is the
set of all row vectors z ∈ Fn+mq for which Mp zT = 0. For
any (m− g)× (n+m) matrix Mp, we have
rank(Mp) + nullity(Mp) = n+m
known as rank-nullity theorem, where nullity(Mp) is the
dimension of Π⊥Mp . Thus,
dim(Π⊥Mp) = n+m− (m− g) = n+ g .
– Let b1, · · · ,bn+g ∈ Fn+mq be a basis of Π⊥Mp . This basis
can be found by solving Mp zT = 0. Let F be a Pseudo
Random Function (PRF): K¯×(I× [1, s]× [1, n+g])→ Fq ,
where I denotes the domain of the source space identifier.
To generate key kp for source Sp, the controller computes
◦ ri ← F (k, id, p, i) ∈ Fq , ∀i ∈ [1, n+ g].
◦ kp ←
∑n+g
i=1 ri bi ∈ Fn+mq .
– Output: a key set K def= {k1, · · · , ks}, where each key,
kp, p ∈ [1, s], is generated as above.
• Sign(ki,v): Outputs t← ki · v ∈ Fq .
• Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (y`, t`, α`)): Outputs the sum
t←∑`i=1 αi ti ∈ Fq .
• Verify(K,y, t): Compute t′ = y · (k1 + · · · + ks), where
ki ∈ K. If t = t′, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
Correctness: Recall from the correctness requirement that
t =
s∑
i=1
g∑
j=1
αi,j ti,j =
s∑
i=1
g∑
j=1
αi,j(vi,j · ki) .
Also, t′ computed by the verification algorithm equals
s∑
i=1
g∑
j=1
αi,j vi,j · (k1 + · · ·+ ks) (1)=
s∑
i=1
g∑
j=1
αi,j(vi,j · ki) .
Equality (1) is because by construction, for all i 6= p, i ∈ [1, s],
p ∈ [1, s], and j ∈ [1, g], vi,j · kp = 0. As computed, t′ = t.
Security: We prove the security of InterMac assuming F is
a secure PRF. For a PRF adversary B, we let PRF-Adv[B, F ]
denote B’s advantage in winning the PRF security game w.r.t.
F . The definition of the PRF security game is provided in [32].
Theorem 3. For any fixed q, n, s, g, InterMac is a secure
(q, n, s, g) multi-source homomorphic MAC, assuming F is a
secure PRF. In particular, for every multi-source homomorphic
MAC adversary A, there is a PRF adversary B who has similar
running time to A, such that
Adv[A, InterMac] ≤ PRF-Adv[B, F ] + 1
q
.
Proof: The proof is by using a sequence of games denoted
as Game 0 and 1. Let W0 and W1 denote the events that A
wins the multi-source homormophic MAC security in Game 0
and 1, respectively. Let Game 0 be identical to Attack Game
1. Hence,
Pr[W0] = Adv[A, InterMac] . (1)
In Game 1, the PRF F is replaced by a truly random function,
i.e., to respond to the queries, the challenger computes kp =∑n+g
i=1 ri xi, where ri
R← Fq instead of ri ← F (k, id, p, i).
Everything else remains the same. Then, there exists a PRF
adversary B such that
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = PRF-Adv[B, F ] . (2)
The complete challenger in Game 1 works as follows:
• Queries: A submits MAC queries (id,Π), where Π =
span(v1,1, · · · ,vs,g). For each p ∈ [1, s], C computes a basis
of Π⊥Mp : x1, · · · ,xn+g . Then, in order to generate kp, C does
– ri
R← Fq , ∀i ∈ [1, n+ g] .
– kp ←
∑n+g
i=1 ri xi ∈ Fn+mq .
In other words, each kp is chosen uniformly at random from
Π⊥Mp , a subspace of size q
n+g . The challenger C then computes
tags for the committed source packets. For i = 1, · · · , s and
j = 1, · · · , g,
– ti,j ← ki · vi,j .
Finally, C sends all the tags and all the keys but one to A.
Without loss of generality, assume that C keeps k1 secret to A.
• Output. A eventually outputs a triplet (id∗,y∗, t∗). Assume
that id∗ = idl, for some l. Let Kl = {k1, · · · , ks} denote the
key set generated for query (idl,Πl). The adversary wins the
game, i.e., event W1 happens, if
– y∗ /∈ Πl, and
– t∗ = y∗ · (k1 + · · ·+ ks)
Note that the adversary knows k2, · · · , ks, therefore, if y∗ · k1
is known, the adversary will be able to forge a valid t∗. In what
follows, we will show that y∗ · k1 is indistinguishable from a
random value in Fq . Let Πl = span(v1,1, · · · ,vs,g). Consider
the following system of linear equations:
v1,1 · k1 = t1,1
· · ·
v1,g · k1 = t1,g
v2,1 · k1 = 0
· · ·
vs,g · k1 = 0
y∗ · k1 = t∗ − y∗ · (k2 + · · ·+ ks)
The first sg equations represent all information that the adver-
sary learns about k1 from its query (idl,Πl). Note that since
y∗ /∈ Πl, y∗ and vi,j (i ∈ [1, s], j ∈ [1, g]) are linearly
independent. As a result, the above system of equations is
consistent regardless of the value of t∗ because the coefficient
matrix has rank sg + 1 which equals the number of equations.
Furthermore, for a fixed y∗, for any value t∗ ∈ Fq , the solution
space always has the same size qn+sg−(sg+1) = qn−1. Because
k1 is chosen uniformly at random from Π⊥M1 , and all solutions
8Network
S1
S2
S3
S4
R1
R2
R3
R4
k1
k2
k3
k4
k1 + k2 + k3
k1 + k2 + k4
k2 + k3 + k4
k1 + k2 + k3 + k4
Fig. 3. An example demonstrating the minimum amount of information
required for carrying out the verification at each receiver when using InterMac.
to the above system of equations are in Π⊥M1 , for a fixed y∗,
its valid tag t∗ could be any value in Fq equally likely. As a
result, the probability that the adversary chooses a correct t∗ is
1
q . Thus,
Pr[W1] =
1
q
. (3)
Equations (1), (2), and (3) together prove the theorem.
Theorem 3 expresses that an adversary A can only forge a
valid tag of a corrupted packet with probability 1q . This security
guarantee may be unsatisfactory when working with a small
field, e.g., q = 28. Nevertheless, as suggested in [17], [18], [20],
[23], the security can be improved by increasing the field size or
using multiple tags. When using ` tags, the security is 1
q`
. Note
that using multiple tags to increase the security is preferable
as increasing the field size increases the field multiplication
complexity logarithmically [18].
Remarks. We make the following two important observations
w.r.t. the verification done in InterMac: (i) a node only needs
to know the sum of the keys for the verification, and (ii) when
there is an upper bound M on the number of possible malicious
sources, it may suffice for a verifying node to know the sum
of just M + 1 keys to carry out the verification.
For instance, consider the network given in Fig. 3. There are
4 source-receiver pairs: (S1, R1), · · · , (S4, R4). As discussed
in Section III-B, in inter-session network coding, a receiver
does not always receive linear combination of source packets
from all the sources. Assume that R1 and R2 only receive
linear combinations of source packets sent by S1 and S2; R3
only receives combinations of source packets sent by S2, S3;
S4 receives linear combinations of source packets from all the
sources; and that the maximum number of malicious sources is
2. Then, the sum of the keys depicted at each receiver in Fig.
3 is sufficient for each node to carry out the verification.
The reason why (k1 + k2 + k3) is sufficient for R1 to verify
a packet y is twofold: (i) If y is a benign packet, k4 ·y = 0 as
k4 ∈ Π⊥M4 ; thus, y · (k1 + · · ·+ k4) = y · (k1 + · · ·+ k3). As a
result, R1 does not need to know k4 to verify a valid packet.
(ii) If y is corrupted, since there is at least one key secret to
the adversary (M = 2), we can use the same line of arguments
as in the proof of Theorem 3 to show that the probability of
forging a valid MAC tag for y is only 1q .
Showing that the other sums are sufficient for R2, R3, and
R4 can be done with similar arguments. Having different sums
for verification at different receivers decreases the damage done
by the adversary who could compromise some of the receivers.
We discuss this in detail at the end of Section V-D.
C. Efficient Commitment
The role of the committed source packets in InterMac is to
enable the controller to generate vectors (MAC keys) that are
orthogonal to the committed space (ΠMp ’s). Here, we design
a more efficient commitment scheme that does not require
each source to send all their source packets to the controller,
but it still allows the controller to generate these orthogonal
vectors. To this end, we leverage two key techniques: padding
for orthogonality and private inner product computation.
The padding for orthogonality technique was originally intro-
duced in [20] to make a random vector orthogonal to all source
packets of multiple generations by padding to each source
packet an additional element. We apply this technique to make
a random vector chosen by the controller, which will serve as
a MAC key, orthogonal to the required subspace (ΠMp ). In
addition, we use the private inner product protocol proposed in
[31] to allow the controller to compute the padding elements
while keeping the random chosen vector private.
Private Inner Product Protocol. Let E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be
a semantically secure homomorphic public-key cryptosystem.
In general, the private inner product protocol (PIP) proposed
in [31] works with various public-key cryptosystems that have
the following homomorphic properties:
• Dec (Enc(m1)Enc(m2) ) = m1 +m2 , and
• Dec (Enc(m1)m2 ) = m1m2 .
Popular cryptosystems that possess the above properties in-
clude Goldwasser-Micali [33], Paillier [34], and Benaloh [35]
cryptosystems. However, not all of them are suited for our
task. Specifically, in Paillier system, the plaintext must be in
Zq , where q is a product of two large primes, making Zq
not a finite field; this system thus does not fit our setting.
In Goldwasser-Micali system, the plaintext domain is F2 and
could be extended to F2` [40]; however, the expansion factor,
i.e., the ratio between the size of the ciphertext and the plaintext,
is very high (up to hundreds), making it not suitable for our
purpose. Benaloh system is an extension of Goldwasser-Micali
system: it reduces the expansion factor significantly; moreover,
its plaintext domain could be a finite field Zq , where q is prime.
Therefore, we choose this system in our instantiation of the PIP
protocol.
Let q be prime, so that Fq is isomorphic to Zq . Let r =
(r1, · · · , rn) be a random vector chosen by the controller C,
and v = (v1, · · · , vn) be a source vector of source S. C and
S carry out the PIP protocol described in Table I. With PIP,
C can learn the inner product r · v while S does not learn
any information about r, thanks to the security guarantee of
the encryption. Indeed, Goethals et al. [31] showed that this
protocol is secure in the semi-honest model, where it is assumed
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1. Setup phase. The controller C does:
Generate a private and public key pair (sk, pk).
Send pk to S.
2. The controller C does for i ∈ [1, n]:
Send ci = Encpk(ri) to S.
3. The source S does:
Send w ←∏ni=1 cvii to C.
4. The source S does:
Compute r · v = Decsk(w).
TABLE I
PRIVATE INNER PRODUCT (PIP) PROTOCOL
that both parties follow the protocol, but they are curious and
try to deduce information from all exchanged data.
Commitment, Padding, and Key Generation (CPK) Proto-
col. Let k ∈ K¯ and F be a PRF: K¯ × (I × [1, s]× [n+ s−
1 +m])→ Fq . Each source packet will be padded with s− 1
elements. Using PIP, the controller C generates the MAC keys
and computes the padding as follows:
1. Setup: Let id be the subspace identifier. For i ∈ [1, s] and
j ∈ [1, n + s − 1 + m], C computes r(j)i ← F (k, id, i, j).
Let ri = (r
(1)
i , · · · , r(n+s−1+m)i ) and rˆi = (r(1)i , · · · , r(n)i ).
2. Commitment: For each i ∈ [1, s], C and Si′ , i′ ∈ [1, s]\{i},
carry out the PIP protocol so that C learns rˆi · vˆi′,j , ∀j ∈
[1, g]. The encryption of these dot products sent from each
source to the controller in the PIP protocol represent the
commitment made by the sources.
3. Padding: Let p(1)i,j , · · · , p(s−1)i,j denote the padding elements
for a source packet vi,j sent by source Si. The padded
source packet, denoted by pi,j , has the following form:
(vˆi,j , p
(1)
i,j , · · · , p(s−1)i,j ,
g(i−1)+j︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) ∈ Fn+s−1+mq
The padding elements are computed by solving the follow-
ing system of s− 1 linear equations:
{ri′ · pi,j = 0}i′∈[1,s]\{i} (4)
For s > 1, this system has s − 1 unknowns and consists
of s − 1 linearly independent equations. Therefore, there
is a unique solution for p(1)i,j , · · · , p(s−1)i,j . C then sends the
padding elements to Si. Si now sends pi,j instead of vi,j .
4. MAC keys: C uses ri as MAC key ki. Equations in (4)
ensure that the chosen key ki is orthogonal to ΠMi .
When using the CPK protocol, the sources no longer need
to send all of their source packets to the controller. Instead,
they only need to send an encryption of the inner product
for every source packet, thereby significantly reducing the
communication cost. Fig. 4 illustrates the CPK protocol for the
network shown in Fig. 1. We use InterMacCPK to denote the
CS1
Enc(rˆ2 · vˆ1)
Enc(rˆ2)
p
(1)
1,1, k1 = r1
S2
Enc(rˆ1 · vˆ2)
Enc(rˆ1)
p
(1)
2,1, k2 = r2
r1, r2
Fig. 4. Keys generation using the CPK protocol for the network of Fig. 1. k1
is orthogonal to the padded vector p2,1 and k2 is orthogonal to p1,1 thanks
to the padding. At the same time, k1 is secret to S2 and k2 is secret to S1.
InterMac construction when using the CPK protocol to generate
MAC keys instead of Generate.
Security. The security of InterMacCPK in the semi-honest
model comes from the security of PIP and InterMac.
Let GenerateCPK denote a new generation algorithm that
takes as input a key k ∈ K¯ and an identifier id, and generates
MAC keys using the CPK protocol. Let InterMacCPK denote
the new InterMac construction with GenerateCPK. Consider
Attack Game 1, previously described in Section V-B, with the
following modified query step:
• Queries: The adversary A chooses a subspace Π and
its identifier id, then sends (id) to the challenger C. A
can make a polynomial number of queries. To response
to a query idl, C initiates the CPK protocol with A to
computes the MAC key set Kl. Let p(1)i,j , · · · , p(s−1)i,j denote
the padding elements of the source packet vi,j sent by
source Si. For each padded source vector pi,j , C can also
compute its MAC tag under key ki = ri:
ti,j = ri · pi,j
= rˆi · vˆi,j + p(1)i,j r(n+1)i + · · ·+ p(s−1)i,j r(n+s−1)i
+ r
(n+s−1+g(i−1)+j)
i .
Finally, C sends all the tags and all the MAC keys in Kl
but one to A.
The setup step, output step, and the winning conditions remain
the same. The definition of security for multi-source homomor-
phic MAC is now with respect to the above modified attack
game. Let Enc-Adv[B2, E ] be the probability that B2 has more
than a random guess to output the correct bit of the public-key
encryption security experiment PubKeavE . We refer the reader to
[32] for the experiment.
Theorem 4. For any fixed q, n, s, g, InterMacCPK is a
secure (q, n, s, g) multi-source homomorphic MAC in the
semi-honest model, assuming F is a secure PRF and E is a
semantically secure public-key encryption. In particular, for
every multi-source homomorphic MAC adversary A, there is
a PRF adversary B1 and a public-key encryption adversary B2
who have similar running time to A, such that
Adv[A, InterMacCPK] ≤ PRF-Adv[B1, F ]+Enc-Adv[B2, E ]+1
q
.
Proof: The proof is by using a sequence of games denoted
as Game 0, 1, and 2. Let W0, W1 and W2 denote the events
that A wins the multi-source homormophic MAC security in
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Game 0, 1, and 2, respectively. Let Game 0 be identical to the
modified Attack Game 0. Hence,
Pr[W0] = Adv[A, InterMacCPK] . (5)
In Game 1, the PRF F is replaced by a truly random function,
i.e., in the CPK setup, the challenger computes r(j)i
R← Fq
instead of r(j)i ← F (k, id, i, j). Everything else remains the
same. Then, there exists a PRF adversary B1 such that
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = PRF-Adv[B1, F ] . (6)
In Game 2, the encryption E is replaced with a per-
fect encryption scheme, i.e., the encryption is information-
theoretically secure. There exists an encryption adversary B2
such that
|Pr[W1]− Pr[W2]| = Enc-Adv[B2, E ] . (7)
Note that in Game 2, (i) in the semi-honest model, the ad-
versary follow the CPK protocol; (ii) the encryptions sent from
the challenger give no information about the random chosen
vectors, ri’s, to the adversary; and (iii) ri’s are indistinguishable
from vectors chosen uniformly at random from Fn+s−1+mq .
Following the same line of argument as in the proof of Theorem
3 gives
Pr[W2] =
1
q
. (8)
Equations (5), (6), (7), and (8) together prove the theorem.
In a stronger threat model, where malicious sources may
not follow the protocol, the security guarantee of InterMacCPK
could still be achieved by adding appropriate controller’s re-
sponses for malicious behaviors. Malicious behaviors of the
sources are limited to (i) not sending a well-formed encryption
back for each query of C, and (ii) not padding the source
packets appropriately. For (i), the controller could exclude any
source with this behavior from the source list and only calculate
MAC keys for the remaining sources. For (ii), not-properly
padded packets will be dropped with high probability as they
are highly likely to be outside of the committed source space.
D. Private Inner Product MAC
InterMac explores the first direction of Observation 3, which
suggests different sources should use different keys. In this
section, we explore the other direction, which suggests that all
tags of the source packets be generated by the trusted controller
instead of the sources, and the MAC key be secret to the
sources. In particular, we show how the PIP protocol could
be combined with SpaceMac previously proposed for intra-
session network coding [25] to provide an alternative MAC-
based scheme for detecting corrupted packets.
SpaceMac consists of a triplet of algorithms: Mac, Combine,
and Verify. The construction of SpaceMac uses a PRF F :
K¯ × (I × [1, n+m])→ Fq and is as follows:
• Mac(k, id,y): The tag t ∈ Fq of an input vector y ∈ Fn+mq
is computed by the following steps:
CS1
Enc(rˆ · vˆ1)
Enc(rˆ)
t1,1
S2
Enc(rˆ · vˆ2)
Enc(rˆ)
t2,1
r← Fk()
Fig. 5. Tags generation using the PM protocol for the network of Fig. 1. The
tags are generated by the controller and the key is secret to the source.
– r← (F (k, id, 1), · · · , F (k, id, n+m)) .
– t← y · r ∈ Fq .
• Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (y`, t`, α`)): The tag t ∈ Fq of
y
def
=
∑`
i=1 αi yi ∈ Fn+mq is computed as follows:
– t←∑`i=1 αi ti ∈ Fq .
• Verify(k, id,y, t): To verify if t is a valid tag of y using
key k, we do the following:
– r← (F (k, id, 1), · · · , F (k, id, n+m)) .
– t′ ← y · r .
– If t′ = t, output 1 (accept); otherwise, output 0 (reject).
Private MAC (PM) Protocol. The controller and the sources
carry the PM protocol to compute tags of the source packets.
The PM protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Setup: Let id be the current subspace identifier. C computes
r(i) ← (F (k, id, i),∀i ∈ [1, n+m]. Let rˆ = (r(1), · · · , r(n))
and r = (r(1), · · · , r(n+m)).
2. Commitment: For each i ∈ [1, s], C and Si carry out the
PIP protocol that allows C to learn rˆ · vˆi,j ,∀j ∈ [1, g]. The
encryption of the inner products sent by the sources to the
controller are the commitment.
3. MAC tags: For vi,j , C computes its tag ti,j = r · vi,j =
rˆ · vˆi,j + r(g(i−1)+j).
Note that PM helps the controller compute the tags on behalf
of the sources without leaking the MAC key. Fig. 5 illustrates
how the SpaceMac MAC tags are computed for the network
shown in Fig. 1. We use SpaceMacPM to denote the SpaceMac
scheme when used with the PM protocol to generate tags for
the source packets as opposed to the Mac algorithm.
Security. The security of SpaceMacPM in the semi-honest
model comes from the security of PIP and SpaceMac. Below,
we analyze the security of SpaceMac when used with the PM
protocol.
Attack Game 2. We consider the following attack game for a
homomorphic MAC T = (Mac, Combine, Verify), a challenger
C, and an adversary A:
• Setup: C generates a random key k R← K¯ .
• Queries. The adversary A chooses a subspace Π and its
identifier id, then sends (id) to the challenger C. A can
make a polynomial number of queries. To response to a
query idl, C initiates the PM protocol to compute tags of
all source packets. C then sends all the tags to A.
• Output. The adversary A outputs a triplet (id∗,y∗, t∗). We
consider that the adversary wins the security game if
(i) id∗ = idl for some l,
(ii) y∗ /∈ Πl, and
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(iii) Verify(k, idl,y∗, t∗) = 1.
Let Adv[A, T ] denote the probability that A wins the above
attack game. We define a secure homomorphic MAC scheme
as follows:
Definition 4. A (q, n, m) homomorphic MAC scheme T is
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A,
Adv[A, T ] is negligible.
Let SpaceMacPM denote the SpaceMac scheme when used
with the PM protocol to generate tags for the source packets as
opposed to the Mac algorithm. The security of SpaceMacPM is
given by the following theorem:
Theorem 5. For any fixed q, n, m, SpaceMacPM is a secure (q,
n, m) homomorphic MAC in the semi-honest model, assuming
F is a secure PRF and E is a semantically secure public-
key encryption. In particular, for every homomorphic MAC
adversary A, there is a PRF adversary B1 and a public-key
encryption adversary B2 who have similar running time to A,
such that
Adv[A,SpaceMacPM] ≤ PRF-Adv[B1, F ]+Enc-Adv[B2, E ]+
1
q
.
Proof: The proof is by using a sequence of games denoted
as Game 0, 1, and 2. Let W0, W1 and W2 denote the events
that A wins the homormophic MAC security in Game 0, 1, and
2, respectively. Let Game 0 be identical to the Attack Game 2.
Hence,
Pr[W0] = Adv[A,SpaceMacPM] . (9)
In Game 1, the PRF F is replaced by a truly random function,
i.e., in the PM setup, the challenger computes r(i) R← Fq instead
of r(i) ← F (k, id, i). Everything else remains the same. Then,
there exists a PRF adversary B1 such that
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = PRF-Adv[B1, F ] . (10)
In Game 2, the encryption E is replaced with a per-
fect encryption scheme, i.e., the encryption is information-
theoretically secure. There exists an encryption adversary B2
such that
|Pr[W1]− Pr[W2]| = Enc-Adv[B2, E ] . (11)
Note that in Game 2, (i) in the semi-honest model, the
adversary follow the PM protocol; (ii) the encryptions sent
from the challenger give no information about the random
chosen vector, r, to the adversary; and (iii) r is indistinguishable
from a vector chosen uniformly at random from Fn+mq . Let
v1, · · · ,vm be the source packets that span Πl (recall that
id∗ = idl for some l). Consider the following system of m+ 1
equations:
r · v1 = t1
· · ·
r · vm = tm
r · y∗ = t∗
The adversary learns the first m equations from its query, and it
wins the security game if the last equation is valid and y∗ /∈ Πl.
This system of equations is consistent regardless of the value
of t∗ because the coefficient matrix has rank m + 1, which
equals the number of equations. Furthermore, for any value t∗,
the solution space always has the same size qn−1. Thus, for
a fixed y∗, its valid tag t∗ could be any value in Fq equally
likely, given that r is chosen uniformly at random from Fn+mq .
As a result, the probability that the adversary chooses a correct
t∗ for any y∗ is 1q , i.e.,
Pr[W2] =
1
q
. (12)
Equations (9), (10), (11), and (12) together prove the theo-
rem.
We note that the security of SpaceMacPM can also be
extended to the malicious model, where there are sources that
may not follow the PM protocol. In this model, a malicious
source Si is limited to not sending back an encryption (of
the inner product of r and the appropriate vi,j) or sending
back a mal-form encryption. In response to these behaviors,
the controller can ignore vi,j in its tag computation and thus,
do not send the tag of vi,j back to Si. The source Si, without
knowing the key, k, will not be able to generate a valid tag for
vi,j (unless vi,j is a linear combination of vectors with already
known tags).
Comparison. Compared to InterMacCPK, SpaceMacPM is sim-
pler in terms of initialization. This is because InterMacCPK
operates on s MAC keys instead of one key. InterMacCPK
and SpaceMacPM have similar efficient Combine and Verify
operations as both of them only involve simple field addition
and multiplication as opposed to exponentiation. When using
SpaceMacPM, all receivers must know the MAC key k in order
to verify their received packets. As a result, as soon as an
adversary compromises a receiver and learns k, it can fool all
other receivers into accepting corrupted packets. We stress that
this is not necessarily the case when using InterMacCPK. For
instance, consider Fig. 3. Assume that S1 and S2 are malicious,
thus keys k1 and k2 are leaked. If the adversary compromises
R1, it learns k3 by subtracting the sum (k1 + k2 + k3)
from (k1 + k2). However, it still cannot fool R2, R3, or R4
into accepting a corrupted packet as the verification at these
receivers involves k4, which is still secret to the adversary.
InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM, as described, could be used
as a drop-in replacement for traditional MACs, e.g., HMAC,
for networks that use inter-session network coding: they allow
the receivers to detect corrupted packets. As when using a
traditional MAC scheme, we assume the keys distribution is
through secure (athentic and private) channels. We also assume
the communication between the sources and the controllers
in the CPK and PM protocols is through athentic channels.
In fact, compromising any node but R4 does not help the
adversary to break the verification of any additional receiver,
and compromising R4 only allows the adversary to break the
verification of one additional receiver, R3, but not all.
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E. In-Network Detection
Both of our MAC schemes could be extended to provide
in-network detection by adopting state-of-the-art techniques
proposed for intra-session network coding. We discuss two
main options below:
Delayed Key Disclosure (TESLA) [36]: This approach leverages
the time dimension to achieve broadcast authentication and has
been adapted to intra-session network coding to provide in-
network detection [11], [18], [24]. In this approach, nodes are
required to loosely synchronize their time. Both InterMacCPK
and SpaceMacPM could be used with the approaches proposed
in [18] and [24] to provide in-network detection for fixed
directed acyclic networks and dynamic peer-to-peer networks,
respectively. We note that the detection schemes based on [18],
[24] are fully collusion resistant and tag-pollution resistant (an
attack on MAC-based schemes that use multiple tags [18]).
Cover-Free Set Systems [37]: This approach leverages cover-
free set systems to probabilistically distribute keys to all nodes
such that any collusion of c nodes or less does not leak all the
keys used in the whole system. This approach has been adapted
to intra-session network coding to provide in-network detection
[20], [27]. Both InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM are suitable
to be used with this approach. Detection schemes based on
[20], [27] are c-collusion resistant. To address tag pollution, we
propose using our homomorphic hash-based detection scheme
to protect the coding coefficients and the tags of the packets.
This technique is motivated by the hybrid scheme MacSig
proposed by Zhang et al. [20], where a homomorphic signature
scheme is used to protect the coding coefficients and the tags.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Bandwidth Overhead
We compute the bandwidth overhead directly from the num-
ber of packets, hashes, and MAC tags described in our schemes.
1) Hash-Based Detection: Our hash-based scheme does not
incur any online bandwidth overhead per packet as there
is no additional symbol attached to each packet. The off-
line bandwidth overhead of this scheme is dominated by the
bandwidth required to distribute both the homomorphic and
traditional hashes from the controller to all the nodes. The size
of a homomorphic hash is |q|. Let |h¯| denote the size of the
traditional hash (for SHA-1, |h¯|=160 bits). The total off-line
bandwidth overhead is sg|G|(|h¯|+ |q|).
2) MAC-Based Detection: The off-line bandwidth overhead
of InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM come from the packets ex-
changed during the execution of the CPK and PM protocols.
The off-line bandwidth overhead of InterMacCPK includes the
overhead of the encryptions of the randomly chosen vectors sent
by the controller, the encryptions of the inner products sent
back by the sources, and the padding sent by the controller,
which is s(s − 1)(ne|q| + ge|q|) + sg(s − 1)|q|, where e
is the expansion factor of the encryption scheme and equals
N
|q| (N is the size of the modulo of the encryption in bits).
The off-line bandwidth overhead of SpaceMacPM includes the
Fig. 6. Percentage of bandwidth saved with PIP as a function of field size.
overhead of the encryption of the randomly chosen vector and
the encryptions of the inner products, which is s(ne|q|+ge|q|).
To be concrete, for N = 256, n = 1024, s = 5, and
g = 100, the off-line bandwidth overhead per source packet
of InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM range from 36% to 1% as
the field size increases from 32 to 256 bits. Fig. 6 shows
the percentage of bandwidth saved when using PIP for the
commitment as opposed to the sources sending all source
packets to the controller. As shown in the Fig. 6, the percentage
of bandwidth saved increases as the field size increases. When
|q| ≥ 128, the percentage of saving is larger than 90% for both
InterMacCPK and SpaceMacPM. The saving could be as much
as 99% for SpaceMacPM when |q| = N = 256.
The online overhead comes from the tags accompanied with
each packet. To provide end-to-end detection, using a single
tag suffices. In this case, the overhead of both InterMacCPK
and SpaceMacPM is
|q|
n|q| (0.1% for n = 1024). To provide in-
network detection for a directed acyclic network, let one of
our MAC schemes be used with the delayed key disclosure
technique in RIPPLE [18]1. Let S0 be a virtual node which
has an edge pointing toward every source node. Define a level
of a node as the length of the longest path from S0 to the node.
Let L be the maximum among the levels of the nodes. Each
packet carries L MAC tags initially; then one or more tags are
peeled off at every node the packet goes through. The average
online overhead per packet is L|q|2n|q| %.
In comparison, on average, the online overhead per packet of
[27] is s(g|q|+|σ|)2n|q| %, where |σ| is the size of a regular public key
signature. We stress that this overhead depends on the number
of source packets whereas ours does not. To be concrete, if we
set L = 16 (as in [18]), |σ| = 320 (DSA), |q| = 128, s = 5,
g = 100, then the overhead per packet of [27] is 32 times
larger than ours ( s(g|q|+|σ|)L|q| ' 32). Fig. 7 plots the average
online overhead per packet of [27], a state-of-the-art intra-
session detection scheme [20], and our MAC-based scheme as
a function of packet length. The range of the packet length
1When using InterMacCPK, the delayed MAC keys must be verified differ-
ently, i.e., using public key verification instead of one-way key chain.
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Fig. 7. Per-packet bandwidth overhead of the homomorphic signature scheme
[27], the hybrid scheme in [20] (c = 1, δ = 0.1,  = 0.01), and our
InterMacCPK/SpaceMacPM when used with RIPPLE [18].
is chosen according to [20] for ease of comparison. This plot
shows that not only is our overhead significantly smaller than
that of [27], but it is also small, as small as 3%. Our overhead
is comparable to that of [20].
B. Computation Overhead
We focus on the online overhead incurred by the operation
performed at each node per packet and neglect the other over-
head, e.g., computing the hashes and MAC keys, as these are
negligible in the number of packets in the network. Similar to
[20], we calculate the computation overhead by approximating
various operations by the number of finite field multiplications.
To calculate the computation time, for ease of comparison, we
adopt the benchmark obtained in [20] on a 2.0 GHz Intel Core
2 CPU, where approximately 2.5× 105 multiplications can be
performed per second for |q|=128.
1) Hash-Based Detection: For each packet, the worst case
scenario is that the node needs to perform a homomorphic
hash check, i.e., performing the Test algorithm of H-DL.
This algorithm entails n + m modular exponentiations (recall
m = sg). In comparison, in the worst case, the scheme in
[27] requires n+m exponentiations plus s public-key signature
verifications. In the best scenario, where the received packet is
decodable, our scheme just requires a traditional hash check.
2) MAC-Based Detection: Let one of our MAC schemes
be used with RIPPLE as described in Section VI-A. For each
packet, the overhead includes one Combine (to generate the
tag of the packet) and one Verify (to verify the integrity of the
packet). Let w be the average number of packets combined by
each node. Then, on average, the Combine algorithm entails
w(L−12 ) multiplications; meanwhile, the Verify algorithm en-
tails n+m+ L−12 multiplications. The total average overhead
is w(L−12 ) + (n+m+
L−1
2 ) multiplications.
In comparison, the average overhead of [27] is n + sg2
exponentiations plus s2 public-key verification. For simplicity,
approximate the cost of one public-key verification (DSA)
by two modular exponentiations. Utilizing the “square and
Fig. 8. Per-packet per-node computation overhead of the signature scheme
[27], the hybrid scheme in [20] (c = 1, δ = 0.1,  = 0.01), our hash-based
scheme, and InterMacCPK/SpaceMacPM when used with RIPPLE [18].
multiple” method for calculating exponentiation over a finite
field Fq , each exponentiation over Fq takes approximately 32 |q|
multiplications on average [20]. The total average overhead is
3
2 |q|(n+ sg2 + s) field multiplications.
For concreteness, let L = 16, w = 4, n = 1024, s = 5, g =
100, and |q| = 128. We approximate a traditional hash check
by 80 field multiplications (1 per iteration of SHA-1) and let the
decodable probability be 50%. Fig. 8 plots the average online
computation overhead per packet per node of the signature-
based scheme in [27], the intra-session detection scheme in
[20], and our hash-based and MAC-based schemes. This plot
shows that the overhead of our hash-based scheme is half of
that of [27]. The computation efficiency would increase with
the decodable probability. The plot also demonstrates that the
overhead of our MAC-based scheme is small, ranging from 4
to 6 ms, and is two orders of magnitude less than the that of
[27] and [20].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce three efficient schemes to detect
pollution attacks in inter-session network coding. The central
idea of our schemes is the use of commitment of source packets.
Our first scheme is a novel combination of homomorphic and
traditional hash functions. The other two schemes are novel
MAC schemes for inter-session network coding: InterMacCPK
and SpaceMacPM. To the best of our knowledge, InterMacCPK is
the first multi-source homomorphic MAC scheme that support
multiple keys. Except when using one-hop decoding, e.g.,
COPE, we recommend using detection schemes built on our
MAC schemes as they have significantly lower computation
overhead. Finally, we recommend using InterMacCPK over
SpaceMacPM when there may be malicious receivers.
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